ECO Newsletter

Some time ago, ECO was pleased to see the phrase “environmentally sound technologies” replaced with “economically, socially and environmentally sound technologies” in the context of technology transfer. The thinking was that the consideration of economic and social implications offered two crucial additional factors planners could use to predict the likely success of technology assimilation in a local setting.

It seemed that what would follow would be a process involving various stakeholders to clarify the meaning of these three terms in various local settings and circumstances — evaluate all three — and provide an opportunity to get real buy-in from intended users.

In the economic category, users might want assurance of a sustainable, long-term business model for the adoption and adaptation of technologies, and assurance that the introduction of new technologies would not result in massive economic displacement.

Likewise, in the social category, planners might want to understand the impacts of technology-induced change of social mores and culture on health, participation of women in the work force, and participation of the most vulnerable sectors of a community. In the environmental category, they might want to consider the risk that the adopted technology could cause unintended harm to complex and critical ecosystem services and biodiversity.
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Being in the country of clocks and watchmakers has put ECO in the mood for WS2 negotiations. WS2 is all about being efficient with the little time we have left, to ensure that greenhouse gas emissions peak well before 2020, and to start the transition to a 100% renewable energy world.

Negotiators are in dire need of a device to maximise their remaining time. While Parties have examined a wide range of potential parts, extolling the virtues of each, ECO believes the mechanics of a well-functioning device consist of only three pieces: renewable energy, energy efficiency and fossil fuel subsidy reform.

By narrowing discussion to these specific initiatives, Parties can save debate time and focus on concrete, implementation-orientated conversations with experts. The technical papers of 2014 and the technical expert meetings have identified the potential of these three tools, and we have clear examples across the world of Parties taking steps to develop them in meaningful ways.

Let us now look into the detailed work of how to scale up our preferred initiatives—the grease to make our time-maximising device work. Policy makers and those implementing these initiatives must frankly and plainly identify the challenges they face. Those providing support should then indicate how they can shift finance and technology to get the gears moving, while UNFCCC institutions and expert input can further smooth the workings.
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Negotiations will shift to the finance section of the elements text today, and there are several key items still missing—partly due to the weak outcomes in Lima—on climate finance. Here are a few examples of areas where the text must be strengthened.

The idea of global collective targets for finance appears here and there in the text, but nowhere is it captured in a sufficiently comprehensive and clear manner. A durable agreement has to set collective targets for the provision of financial support to developing countries, one for mitigation, and one for adaptation – and regularly review and adjust these targets as part of the agreement cycles. In particular, a collective target for public finance for adaptation is key in light of the large gap between what is required and what is currently offered on that front.

The agreement must include regular cycles of finance commitments by developed countries (and countries with similar responsibility and capability) to contribute to the fulfilment of the two targets mentioned above. So far, developed countries have completely rejected this concept – ahem! No commitments? Isn’t this what treaties are about? What you do and what I do (and what we do collectively)?

To better understand where the gaps are, the Paris agreement should establish a process or mechanism that enables developing countries to iteratively identify the support they require for ambitious action, beyond what they can do without that support.
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Norway likes its image of the good student who always completes its homework, and is on time at that. And so too with its INDC. Last Friday, we saw the Norwegian government publish its new emission reduction targets for 2030.

The idea is, surprisingly, to start negotiations with the EU, with the goal of being included in the entire EU climate framework—both ETS and non-ETS sectors. This would mean adopting all EU targets, including a 43% reduction in the ETS sector by 2030, and with a clear intention of buying as many ETS allowances as possible. The hope seems to be that this will reduce the need to bother the petroleum industry with more restrictions, and stop new regulations in the transport sector — an approach that may please some. The petroleum industry, increasingly active in the vulnerable Arctic, will soon have to face the reality that it has no place in the future renewable society.

One good thing that might come out of this alignment with the EU is that Norway soon might feel a need to leave the Umbrella Group, which definitely is not good company for a model student.

The final meetings of the Structured Expert Dialogue (SED) have begun! There are two life or death questions on the table: 1) “Is below 2°C enough to fulfil the goal of the convention?” and 2) “Is enough progress being made to achieve the goal?” The SED’s message is clear: science says warming of 2ºC will lead to numerous intolerable consequences that could be avoided if warming stays below 1.5ºC.

These consequences do threaten food security, increased extreme weather events, rising sea levels of more than 50cm with serious effects for many coastal zones and endanger the existence of several nations for starters. ECO is sadden by the reality that this list isn’t exhaustive.

Yesterday, AOSIS demonstrated what is required for the survival of many communities in small island states through proposing a “well-below 1.5ºC ” target to be included in the negotiation text for the Paris agreement.

Today, we hope more time is spent on on the second question. Real world evidence shows us: “no, impacts are worsening”, but experts still have an important part to play. When expertise and real world experience come together surely Parties have no choice but boosting their mitigation and adaptation ambition?

To be clear, whatever happens, we will have to phase out emissions to zero to reach any cap in warming, it is only a matter of timing.
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Dear delegates, perhaps you’ve lain awake at night wondering how you will feed your family now that your livestock has died in the most recent drought? Or perhaps you’ve wondered if your family can rebuild your home yet again after two typhoons in a row? Or how long your children will be able to live on your ancestral land that is being encroached upon by king tides?

ECO can only assume that, at least for now, you’ve been spared the climate loss and damage that some of our most vulnerable kin are already experiencing. It is simply not possible to adapt to the worst impacts of climate change—this is why we must build institutions capable of dealing with this multi-faceted challenge.

The Warsaw International Mechanism for Loss and Damage is a good start—but we must be vigilant to ensure it addresses the needs of the most vulnerable, and we must be open for new steps if it doesn’t suffice. Furthermore, we must secure a reliable source of finance for loss and damage—acknowledging that the lower the mitigation ambition is and the less adaptation support is provided, the more the costs of loss and damage will mount.

It would only be fair to raise the necessary resources from those who are most responsible for the greenhouse gas emissions that are causing catastrophic climate change impacts.

As we get into the nitty-gritty of ADP negotiations here in Geneva, it is always important to keep in mind the events and discussions happening outside of the UNFCCC process. For those unaware, finance ministers from the G20 are gathering today and tomorrow in Turkey to discuss G20 priorities, two of which are climate change and climate finance this year.

From Geneva to Istanbul, we’d like to remind our finance ministers of a commitment their leaders made over 5 years ago: to phase out fossil fuel subsidies. It’s a pity that governments have to be reminded over and over again of their commitments, but we’ll keep doing so until they are fulfilled.

Last Friday, 40 NGOs from countries all over the world sent a letter to the Turkish G20 President and all G20 finance ministers, calling on the phase-out of fossil fuel subsidies. The letter called for the immediate elimination of production and exploration subsidies because, let’s face it, that money could be much better spent on climate action at home and abroad.

If the G20 really wants to prioritise climate change and climate finance, then ministers should tighten those purse strings and stop support for fossil fuels.

Switzerland was right to remind Parties yesterday afternoon that as countries achieve higher levels of development they should, over time, move towards economy-wide emissions budgets. This will help us stay within the remaining global carbon budget and also make the required infrastructure and other structural changes needed to phase out all fossil fuel emissions as early as possible and no later than 2050.

But there’s more to it than that. Kyoto Protocol Annex B countries in particular should recall that the principle of “no backsliding” means that their INDCs should be in the form of QELROs, which are in essence carbon budgets. It would not do, for example, if the EU simply put forward a 40% target for the year 2030 without mentioning the absolute cumulative emissions target. (Of course, the other glaring problem is that 40% should have been the EU target for 2020 . . .)

Other countries with high responsibility and capability, such as the United States, also need to define the trajectories towards their emission reduction targets for specific years. For the US, this means defining the area under the curve towards the 26-28% reduction target for 2025. Others who have or have had QELROs in the past (that includes you, Canada!)
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ECO hates to spoil the fun — and yesterday’s plenary was great — but we can’t help but wonder about the disconnect between the Lima compromise on CBDR&RC and the framing on differentiation throughout the current elements text.

The Lima compromise says “CBDR&RC, in light of national circumstances”. This, just to state the obvious, is very different from saying that developed countries will do X and developing countries will do Y. Speaking of X and Y, or annex X and annex Y, the differentiation question is already straining to break into open discussion.

Such discussion — especially if well-facilitated — would be an extremely good idea, and suggests to Parties that one of the 6-8 pm slots here in Geneva should be used to start the conversation. How about Tuesday night?