The Kyoto Protocol is a consensus-building and democratic treaty. In adopting any amendments, the KP’s procedures try to keep everyone happy by ensuring every effort is taken to achieve agreement by consensus.
But when a country, or even a few countries, are blocking progress, the KP also allows an amendment to be adopted ‘as a last resort’ by a three quarters majority vote. Once the minimum requirements have been reached, amendments of course only enter into force for those countries that have deposited their instruments of acceptance – otherwise they cannot access the new benefits that the KP, as amended, can bring.
Concerning the the ‘hot air’ problem, for example, this means that if Russia decides not to agree or ratify an amendment that would cut out 13 Gt of hot air, they would still keep their surplus credits but there would be no market for them. In that instance, those that did ratify such an amendment for CP2, giving them continued access to the Kyoto mechanisms, and with their new QELROs inscribed in Annex B, would have agreed not to buy any such hot air.
On a related subject, ECO reminds the EU member states – and the European Parliament concurs – that under the EU treaties their common positions on environmental issues can be agreed by qualified majority voting. As far as Doha is concerned, this means that ministers from a coalition of progressive countries can move the EU from being a craven fence-sitter to a dynamic supporter of action to remove a big part of the gigatonne gap. If this happens and Poland (and any others similarly disposed) refuses to ratify KP CP2, that will not hold back the whole of the Union.